Cancelable biometric schemes for Euclidean metric and Cosine metric
The handy biometric data is a double-edged sword, paving the way of the prosperity of biometric authentication systems but bringing the personal privacy concern. To alleviate the concern, various biometric template protection schemes are proposed to protect the biometric template from information leakage. The preponderance of existing proposals is based on Hamming metric, which ignores the fact that predominantly deployed biometric recognition systems (e.g. face, voice, gait) generate real-valued templates, more applicable to Euclidean metric and Cosine metric. Moreover, since the emergence of similarity-based attacks, those schemes are not secure under a stolen-token setting.
For more information: Cancelable biometric schemes for Euclidean metric and Cosine metric | Cybersecurity | Full Text (springeropen.com)
Authors: Yubing Jiang, Peisong Sheng, Li Zeng, Xiaojie Zhu, Di Jiang & Chi Chen